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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the 1970s placed 
potentially vast areas of the sea under national jurisdiction. Moving from 
relatively modest territorial seas close to the coast as the only basis of fisheries 
jurisdiction for States, the international community suddenly embraced a new 
form of jurisdiction over resources that extended fisheries up to 200 nautical 
miles from land. This extension brought over one third of the world’s oceans, or, 
more importantly, approximately 90% of the world’s wild fish catch, under 
national jurisdiction.1 
While the possibility of bringing these areas’ resources under national 
control was of tremendous value to many developing States, the difficulties of 
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THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE, 94 (2012). 
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enforcement over such areas were not so readily considered. Some States, 
notably the States of the South Pacific, but by no means restricted to them, 
simply lacked the capacity to police their waters and protect their resources from 
the depredation of others. Adding a vast area subject to national jurisdiction 
often required that States expend substantial assets—at sea and in the air—in 
order to effectively patrol, police, and enforce their new jurisdiction. For oil and 
gas exploitation, the lack of a significant coast guard or naval force to deploy in 
the EEZ was not a huge problem as exploitation of the seabed is a slow and 
expensive business. For fisheries, which can be exploited far more cheaply, and 
in a more transitory fashion, this lack of enforcement capacity represented a 
potentially serious impediment. 
In the years since the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea2 
was opened for signature, many States have learned that maintaining a capability 
to enforce their laws in their EEZ is expensive and difficult. Some valuable 
fisheries have been seriously damaged by illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
(IUU) fishing, often in areas that are difficult to patrol by virtue of geography 
and lack of capacity. In the latter case, the inability to enforce the fisheries laws 
of the coastal State has been credited as a contributing cause of the rise of piracy 
in the waters around Somalia in the past decade.3 Considering the difficulties 
present in enforcing coastal State law, combined with the inexorable rise in IUU 
fishing and a greater emphasis on international cooperation in the management 
of straddling and high seas fish stocks, it is natural that States have begun to 
explore the possibility of cooperation in the patrol and enforcement of their 
EEZ. 
This paper will consider the range of responses by States to their individual 
lack of enforcement capacity and the types of cooperative response that have 
arisen from the present situation. 
I. 
TYPES OF COOPERATION 
Cooperation between States over issues of maritime enforcement can be 
characterized into a number of types based on a continuum of engagement in 
cooperation. For the purposes of argument here, cooperation has been placed 
into one of three categories: 
• Data exchange and observers 
• Boarding and referral to the flag State 
• Boarding and arrest by a third State 
 2.  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 3.  Ishaan Tharoor, How Somalia’s Fishermen Became Pirates, TIME (Apr. 18, 2009), 
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1892376,00.html. 
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Each type of cooperation represents a different level of enforcement engagement 
along a continuum from virtually nothing to another State stepping into the 
shoes of the flag State. Strictly speaking, exchanging data and the deployment of 
independent observers is very much at the lowest end of engagement, where 
everything but the collection of the most basic eye-witness testimony as to 
fishing activities and catch volumes still rests with the flag, coastal, or port 
State. Boarding and referral represents a greater level of engagement, where 
only a portion of the authority is vested in a third party. Finally, boarding and 
arrest represents the complete vesting of jurisdiction and authority in a third 
party. 
The frequency of the use of these different arrangements is inversely 
proportional to the level of authority given to a third State seeking to enforce the 
law. Such a situation is to be expected given the great reluctance of States to 
cede their authority to others. Nevertheless, the difficulties of enforcement and 
concerns over IUU fishing have compelled some States to be prepared to 
cooperate even at the expense of what they might see as their traditional 
prerogatives. 
A. Data Exchange and Observers 
Far and away the most common arrangement for cooperation in maritime 
enforcement is data exchange and the deployment of observers. Cooperation in 
the sharing of data and the use of observers in fisheries has been employed in a 
number of agreements.4 It has typically been used as a mechanism to ensure that 
compliance is effectively monitored by flag and port States. 
A system of observation and inspection typically involves a Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization (RFMO) facilitating the placement of an 
observer aboard a fishing vessel for all or part of its voyage. Generally, the 
observer will be from another State and will be able to watch the fishing 
activities and inspect the catch. The observer will also have the ability to report 
back to the RFMO with respect to any possible breaches of fisheries 
conservation measures that occurred aboard the vessel. 
It is important to note that an observer has no ability to affect the conduct 
of fisheries operations aboard a vessel, nor does the observer have a power of 
arrest. The observer’s presence is passive, and the report he or she provides 
typically factors into discussions by State parties at meetings of the RFMO, 
rather than providing a basis for punitive action by the flag State.5 
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR) gives an example of an observation and inspection scheme in action.6 
 4.  See generally LENFEST OCEAN PROGRAM, RFMO REPORT CARD: ON GOVERNANCE OF 
BYCATCH AND DISCARDS BY REGIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS (2012) 
(providing a short contemporary summary of RFMO practices). 
 5.  See STUART B. KAYE, INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 389–97 (2001). 
 6.  Convention on Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May 12, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, 1329 
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The Convention itself provides for the scheme under Article XXIV, although the 
details of its operation are limited since the State parties chose to leave the 
mechanics of such a scheme to a later date.7 The Convention did, however, 
prescribe three principles under which the scheme would operate: 
• Cooperation between States to establish procedures for boarding and 
inspection and for flag State prosecutions, consistent with 
international practice;8 
• Observation and inspection of vessels engaged in harvesting or 
research;9 and 
• Inspectors remaining subject to jurisdiction of the member State of 
which they are nationals, and reports from them being transmitted to 
the Commission.10 
It took over half a decade to bring the scheme to fruition,11 and the State 
parties formally adopted it in 1989, eight years after the Convention entered into 
force. It operated under the auspices of a Standing Committee on Observation and 
Inspection (SCOI), which established a system of observation and inspection in 
1988.12 
The system adopted provides for the designation of qualified individuals as 
inspectors and observers who may be placed aboard vessels engaged in scientific 
U.N.T.S. 48 [hereinafter CCAMLR]. 
 7.  CCAMLR, supra note 6, art. XXIV(1) provides: “In order to promote the objective and ensure 
observance of the provisions of this Convention, the Contracting Parties agree that a system of 
observation and inspection be established.” 
 8.  CCAMLR, supra note 6, art. XXIV(2)(a) provides: 
Contracting Parties shall cooperate with each other to ensure the effective 
implementation of the system of observation and inspection, taking account of the 
existing international practice. This system shall include, inter alia, procedures for 
boarding and inspection by observers and inspectors designated by Members of the 
Commission and procedures for flag State prosecutions and sanctions on the basis of 
evidence resulting from such boarding and inspections. A report of such prosecutions 
and sanctions imposed shall be included in the information referred to in Article XXI 
of this Convention; 
 9.  CCAMLR, supra note 6, art. XXIV(2)(b) provides: 
In order to verify compliance with measures adopted under this Convention, 
observation and inspection shall be carried out on board vessels engaged in scientific 
research or harvesting of marine living resources in the area to which this Convention 
applies, through observers and inspectors designated by Members of the Commission 
and operating under terms and conditions to be established by the Commission; 
 10.  CCAMLR, supra note 6, art. XXIV(2)(c) provides: “[D]esignated observers and inspectors 
shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals. They shall 
report to the Member of the Commission by which they have been designated which in turn shall report 
to the Commission.” 
 11.  The implementation of Article XXIV was not immediate, and the issue itself was only raised 
at the third Commission meeting in 1984. See Comm’n for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Res., Rep. of the 3d Meeting of the Comm’n, ¶¶ 26–29 (1984). 
 12.  Id. ¶¶ 111–21. The SCOI recommendations were adopted by State parties the following year 
in toto. See id. ¶¶ 29–36. 
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research or harvesting in the CCAMLR area.13 Inspectors are drawn from a register 
maintained by the CCAMLR,14 must be nationals of the State party nominating 
them,15 and must speak the language of the flag State of the vessel to be observed 
or inspected.16 When aboard a vessel, an inspector remains solely subject to the 
jurisdiction of his or her nominating State.17 Each State party must provide prior 
notification of all vessels intending to enter the CCAMLR area to harvest resources 
during the year commencing July 1 by May 1 of the same year.18 Any such vessels 
are potentially subject to inspection. 
The inspector has wide powers with respect to access, but not enforcement. 
Inspectors may observe and inspect the catch, the gear used, data collected, and any 
records of and reports on catch and location data.19 Inspectors also may photograph 
alleged violations of conservation measures and affix identification marks to gear 
allegedly used in contravention of conservation measures.20 In the event a breach is 
observed, the inspector is only empowered to alert the master of the vessel of the 
breach and log it in the official inspection report.21 This report is transmitted to the 
flag State from the inspector’s State via CCAMLR, although the flag State can 
comment upon the report prior to its formal consideration at a Commission 
meeting.22 Enforcement action is the responsibility of the flag State alone. 
It is clear from this system that although the inspector has wide powers to 
collect evidence of a breach, only the flag State has the right to prosecute an 
offense. There is no requirement that the flag State take any action, even when 
 13.  Comm’n for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Res., Rep. of the Standing 
Comm. on Observation and Inspection, Observation and Inspection System, items I(a), III (1984) 
[hereinafter Observation and Inspection System], reprinted in Comm’n for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Res., Rep. of the 7th Meeting of the Comm’n, 93–101 (1984). Inspectors can 
be either placed aboard or inspect from a vessel under their own State’s flag. See id. items I(d), I(e), III(a), 
III(b), III(c); see also Rosemary Rayfuse, Enforcement of High Seas Fisheries Agreements: 
Observation and Inspection Under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources, 13 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 579, 589 (1998). 
   14.  Observation and Inspection System, supra note 13, item II. 
   15.  Id., item I(c). This is consistent with CCAMLR art. XXIV(2)(c). See CMMALR, supra note 6. 
   16.  Observation and Inspection System, supra note 13, item I(d) (appearing to assume that the 
captain and crew also speak the language of the flag State). 
   17.  Observation and Inspection System, supra note 13, item I(c). This is consistent with 
CCAMLR art. XXIV(2)(c). See CMMALR, supra note 6. 
   18.  Parties must provide information including the name of the vessel, the call sign of the vessel 
registered with appropriate flag State authorities, the home port and nationality of the vessel, the owner or 
charterer of the vessel, and notification that the ’vessel’s master is aware of the conservation measures in 
force for the areas where the vessel will be harvesting. See Observation and Inspection System, supra 
note 13, item IV. 
 19.  Id., item VI. 
 20.  Id., item VI(e). 
 21.  Id., item VIII. 
 22. Id., item IX. These procedures were amended in 1992, 1996, and 1997 to provide for time 
limits on the submission of reports, and expedition of consideration of reports by flag States. See 
Comm’n for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Res., Rep. of the 11th Meeting of the 
Comm’n, 92 (1992); Rayfuse, supra note 13, at 593. 
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presented with conclusive evidence of the most egregious breach. This 
demonstrates the significant limitation inherent in the inspection and observation 
system. 
B. Boarding and Referral to Flag State 
The next type of cooperative response vests an ability to board and inspect 
in a third State but continues to leave enforcement action in the hands of the flag 
State. To some extent, this type of action superficially resembles the placing of 
an inspector aboard, although the reality of the intervention is a little more 
involved. 
Upon the high seas, there are substantial restrictions upon the boarding of a 
vessel by any ship other than a Government vessel of the vessel’s flag State. The 
circumstances where a boarding can be undertaken are extremely limited and 
largely apply to Stateless vessels or instances of serious international crimes 
such as piracy or the slave trade. In the ordinary course of events, without the 
concurrence of the flag State, a boarding to do anything more than establish 
identity is contrary to international law. 
The concurrence of the flag State can be supplied in a variety of ways. 
First, a flag state can concur by way of a bilateral agreement between it and the 
boarding State. Such an agreement would be a treaty-level document and would 
permit a right to stop and board in certain circumstances. The most widely cited 
examples of these are the agreements, which are not directed at fishing activity, 
between the United States and a range of largely open registry States to permit 
boarding to investigate for the presence of weapons of mass destruction or their 
precursors.23 
Second, a flag State can provide consent to a third party through the use of 
multilateral agreements. This is the most common way such boarding 
permission is achieved, and a number of examples of this can be identified. For 
example, under Article 21 of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement,24 State 
parties to a regional fisheries arrangement effectively authorize other State 
parties to board and inspect their fishing vessels while fishing on the high seas in 
the area covered by that arrangement.25 If a boarding were to take place 
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to violations of any conservation measures, any 
 23.  See generally Ship Boarding Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm (last visited July 31, 2014) (providing background 
information and links to the agreements). 
 24.  United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Sept. 8, 1995, 2167 
U.N.T.S. 88 [hereinafter UNFSA]. 
 25.  Id. art. 21(1), 21(2); see also Howard L. Brown, The United Nations Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: An Analysis of International 
Environmental Law and the Conference’s Final Agreement, 21 VT. L. REV. 547, 583 (1996). 
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evidence is secured and the flag State notified.26 The flag State then has a 
limited period in which to initiate an investigation itself or to authorize the 
inspecting State to do so.27 Serious violations28 that are not the subject of a 
response by the flag State could see a vessel directed to the nearest appropriate 
port.29 
In practice, few boardings under Article 21-style arrangements appear to 
have taken place. That this is so should not be surprising. First, the efficacy of 
undertaking boardings in these circumstances still depends upon the flag State 
undertaking a prosecution—a circumstance that would not be certain without 
prior arrangement between the State parties. As a result, there have been few 
boardings stemming from an opportunistic encounter at sea. Second, few States 
will be interested in undertaking enforcement operations far from home in 
waters beyond their national jurisdiction. 
C. Boarding and Arrest By a Third State 
The rarest and most invasive form of cooperative enforcement is where one 
State empowers another to act on its behalf, effectively placing itself in the 
position of the flag State. This is essentially using another State’s vessel and 
personnel to undertake boarding and arrest. The ultimate prosecution of arrested 
individuals is still retained by the coastal State, but all elements prior to the 
handover of arrested persons and their vessel are in the hands of a third State. 
This mechanism gives tremendous reach of enforcement, as, in addition to a 
coastal ’State’s own platforms, it may be able to make use of the ships and 
aircraft of another State. 
There are a number of issues to be considered in such a situation. First, one 
should look at the jurisdictional space in which such activities might occur. In 
the ordinary course of events, there is no freedom of navigation in the territorial 
sea of a coastal State for foreign ships. A right of innocent passage can be 
asserted, but undertaking enforcement operations will manifestly fall within the 
list of matters in Article 19 of the Law of the Sea Convention that are 
inconsistent with such passage. As such, any enforcement arrangement will need 
either to be inapplicable to illegal fishing in its territorial sea or to provide the 
 26.  UNFSA, supra note 24, art. 21(5). 
 27.  Id., art. 21(6). 
 28.  The term “serious violation” is defined to include nine offenses, including: fishing without 
a valid authorization from the flag State; failing to maintain accurate records of the catch as required 
by the regional fisheries organization; fishing in a closed area, during a closed season, or without or 
beyond an authorized quota; fishing for a stock that is prohibited or subject to a moratorium; using 
prohibited gear; falsifying or concealing the markings, identity, or registration of the vessel; 
concealing, tampering with, or disposing of evidence relating to an investigation; multiple violations 
that constitute a serious disregard of conservation and management measures; and, other violations 
specified as such by the regional organization. See UNFSA, supra note 24, art. 21(11). 
 29.  UNFSA, supra note 24, art. 21(8), 21(10). 
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flag State with an authority to undertake actions beyond what is permitted by 
innocent passage.30 
Second, mechanisms need to be in place to facilitate consistency between 
the flag State and the coastal State’s laws. The use of another State’s personnel 
in enforcement will naturally require harmonization of laws with respect to 
matters such as the appropriate use of force, search and evidentiary matters, 
custodial matters and handover, and the liability of personnel in the event of an 
authorized activity taking place. Each of these matters has a substantial impact 
upon a specific operation. A prosecution may ultimately fail if there are 
breaches of rules of evidence or mistreatment of arrested persons. In addition, 
future cooperation may be jeopardized if personnel undertaking a boarding or 
arrest are pursued through the coastal State’s courts. 
Finally, although an enforcement operation is being undertaken, it may be 
assumed that a flag State will not wish to prejudice the sovereign immunity of 
its vessel. Although it is exercising the jurisdiction of another State, a flag State 
will not wish to consent to any action that might create a situation where the 
coastal State’s laws have any application aboard their ship. 
1. Case Study: Ad Hoc Cooperation—South Tasman Rise Disputes 
The South Tasman Rise is an area in which the continental shelf extends a 
substantial distance to the south of the large Australian island of Tasmania. The 
area of relatively shallow water extends a little over 200 nautical miles from the 
territorial sea baselines around Tasmania’s south-eastern coast; consequently, 
there are rich fishing grounds in waters just outside Australia’s EEZ. These 
waters provide a habitat for the orange roughy, a species that has suffered from 
heavy commercial fishing around southern Australia and New Zealand since the 
early 1980s. 
The orange roughy is an unusual fish whose life cycle has impacted efforts 
at commercial exploitation. The species is extremely long-lived, and breeds only 
when decades old, meaning that its exploitation was unsuited to a more common 
pattern of size being used as a designator of breeding maturity. Full-sized orange 
roughy might be decades away from breeding, and their removal from the 
biomass has implications for the stock’s ability to regenerate. Unfortunately, the 
details of the orange roughy’s life-cycle were not fully understood when 
commercial exploitation began. As a result, stocks in waters proximate to 
Australia and New Zealand were heavily overfished. This made more remote 
stocks, like those on the South Tasman Rise, very appealing to fishing vessels. 
The two disputes concerning orange roughy exploitation on the South 
Tasman Rise both have their origins in the element that was responsible for the 
Estai dispute between Spain and Canada.31 In both the Estai and Tasman cases, 
 30.  This situation is dealt with explicitly in the 2007 Australia-France Enforcement 
Agreement, infra note 44. 
 31.  Rep. of the Int’l Court of Justice, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v Can.), ¶¶ 177–90, U.N. 
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a fishery with a straddling stock extended just out of a coastal State EEZ, the 
coastal state was concerned about limiting exploitation of a threatened stock, 
and Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) sought to exploit the stock in the 
waters beyond national regulation. In 1997, New Zealand fishing vessels 
targeted the South Tasman Rise fishery just outside the Australian EEZ. The 
Australian response was to raise the matter at a diplomatic level with New 
Zealand and attempt to negotiate a solution.32 Australia did not pursue a more 
forthright response along the lines of Canada’s arrest of the Estai in 1995 
because it endeavored to remain within the bounds of accepted international 
practice. Rather, the parties initiated negotiations, consistent with Article 116 of 
the Law of the Sea Convention, and reached a mutually acceptable solution. 
Early in 1998, the two States concluded an arrangement that set precautionary 
catch limits for orange roughy in the areas beyond the Australian Fishing Zone 
and provided for collaboration of the two States in a research program to better 
manage the stock.33 Both the arrangement and cooperation on the management 
of the fishery have continued.34 
The travails of the orange roughy on the South Tasman Rise by no means 
ended in 1998. The following year, vessels flagged in States outside the region 
began to take an interest in the stock, again just outside the Australian Fishing 
Zone. In 1999, at least four vessels were observed on the high seas portion of the 
South Tasman Rise fishing for orange roughy. The vessels were flagged in 
South Africa and Belize, and the Australian Government immediately 
approached these two States to request that the vessels cease fishing orange 
roughy. The requests were based on the fact that the stocks were subject to an 
international management regime with New Zealand, and that South Africa and 
Belize should desist fishing pending their participation in negotiations to assist 
in the management of the fishery, consistent with Article 116 of the Law of the 
Sea Convention.35 
Doc. A/54/4 (1999) (providing a summary of the facts given by the ICJ in subsequent litigation 
arising out of the case). 
 32.  See AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC., FISHERIES AND FORESTRY, FISHERY STATUS 
REPORTS 2007 (2007), http://data.daff.gov.au/brs/data/warehouse/brsShop/data/19_FSR07_strtf.pdf. 
 33.  Arrangement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
for the Conservation and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise, Austl.-N.Z., 
Feb. 18, 1998 (expired Feb. 28, 1999), reprinted at 
https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/documents/roughy.pdf. 
 34.  The TAC (total allowable catches) dropped dramatically from 2400 tons in 1999 to only 
200 tons in 2006–2007, and even this modest level was not reached. Australia and New Zealand 
agreed to a TAC of zero tons in 2007–2008 and indefinitely thereafter. See AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF 
AGRICULTURE, SOUTH TASMAN RISE TRAWL FISHERY 239–41 (2007). 
 35.  See JANE WILLING, ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND 
THE GOVERNMENT OF NEW ZEALAND FOR THE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF ORANGE 
ROUGHY ON THE SOUTH TASMAN RISE (2002), reprinted in PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE FAO-
NORWAY EXPERT CONSULTATION ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SHARED FISH STOCKS, FOOD & AGRIC. 
ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS REPORT NO. 695. SUPPLEMENT (2003). 
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The responses from both States were encouraging. South Africa requested 
that its vessels cease fishing, on pain of revocation of high seas fishing licenses. 
South Africa ultimately applied this sanction. Belize requested that its vessel 
cease fishing, to no avail. Belize subsequently deregistered the vessel, and via 
formal written authorization, requested that Australia enforce Belize law on its 
behalf if the vessel continued to fish. Shortly after Belize gave its authorization, 
the vessel departed.36 The incidents are good examples of the type of ad hoc 
cooperation that may be possible to deal with managing fisheries. In both cases, 
Australia lacked the regulatory responsibility to unilaterally enforce 
conservation measures on the South Tasman Rise as the waters were beyond 
national jurisdiction. 
2. Case Study: Enforcement Cooperation—Niue Treaty 
The Niue Treaty37 was concluded in 1992, with a view to assisting the 
States of the South Pacific in patrolling and enforcing fisheries laws within the 
vast areas of maritime jurisdiction within their EEZs. 
The Niue Treaty’s purpose of facilitating cooperation is explicit in 
Article III: 
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the enforcement of their fisheries laws and 
regulations in accordance with this Treaty and may agree on forms of assistance 
for that purpose. 
 
2. The Parties shall cooperate to develop regionally agreed procedures for the 
conduct of fisheries surveillance and law enforcement. Where appropriate, 
fisheries surveillance and law enforcement will be conducted in accordance with 
such regionally agreed procedures.38 
The cooperation is made manifest in a variety of ways. First, there is 
cooperation on the dissemination of data about fishing activities throughout the 
region. This allows States to be more effective in their enforcement activities. 
This becomes particularly valuable where States have few platforms to conduct 
enforcement. 
Article VI considers cooperation through boarding and arrest. It provides in 
part: 
1. A Party may, by way of provisions in a Subsidiary Agreement or otherwise, 
permit another Party to extend its fisheries surveillance and law enforcement 
activities to the territorial sea and archipelagic waters of that Party. In such 
circumstances, the conditions and method of stopping, inspecting, detaining, 
directing to port and seizing vessels shall be governed by the national laws and 
regulations applicable in the State in whose territorial sea or archipelagic waters 
the fisheries surveillance or law enforcement activity was carried out. 
 36.  See Rachel Lord, Fisheries—straddling fish stocks—orange roughy, 20 AUSTL. Y.B. 
INT’L L. (Centre for International and Public Law) 1, 422–23 (1999). 
 37.  Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South 
Pacific Region, July 9, 1992, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Niue Treaty]. 
 38.  Id. art. III. 
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2. Vessels seized by another Party pursuant to an agreement under paragraph 1 of 
this Article in the territorial sea or archipelagic waters of a Party shall, together 
with the persons on board, be handed over as soon as possible to the authorities of 
that Party.39 
In essence, Article VI provides that a State party can use a Subsidiary 
Agreement to allow for the boarding and arrest of vessels flying its flag by an 
enforcement vessel of another State. Such an agreement will spell out the 
circumstances and nature of the use of a power of boarding and arrest. The 
Subsidiary Agreement empowers the vessels of one State party to undertake 
EEZ enforcement operations on behalf of another State, effectively widening the 
range and number of enforcement vessels that can undertake enforcement 
operations. 
There are a number of limitations on the effectiveness of the Niue Treaty. 
First, there are very few Subsidiary Agreements that subsist on a permanent 
basis.40 Some agreements have been negotiated as temporary arrangements, but 
even these have been few and far between. Second, even with a larger number of 
Subsidiary Agreements, there is still a dearth of vessels to undertake 
enforcement operations. For example, during operation Tui Moana 12, which 
was designed to give effect to the Subsidiary Agreement between the Cook 
Islands and Samoa, vessels from the two States were joined by Royal New 
Zealand Navy ships, Royal New Zealand Air Force aircraft, and French and 
American patrol aircraft.41 While it is encouraging that such an operation took 
place at all, had the efforts been left to Samoa and the Cook Islands, there would 
have been very little impact given their relative paucity of equipment and 
platforms for patrolling a vast area. 
The limited number of Subsidiary Agreements has undermined the 
effectiveness of the Niue Treaty, as it limits the efficacy of cooperation to 
essentially data exchange and related activities. This has long been a concern 
and has spurred along efforts to negotiate a multilateral Niue Treaty Subsidiary 
Agreement. The negotiation of a general multilateral Subsidiary Agreement has 
been afoot since 2009.42 Such an agreement would be a boon to the operation of 
 39.  Id. art. VI. 
 40.  For example, the Te Vaka Toa Arrangement between the Cook Islands, New Zealand, 
Niue, Samoa, Tonga and Tokelau was only finalized in July 2011. See Developing and Protecting 
Marine Resources, New Zealand Aid Programme, N.Z. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. AND TRADE, 
http://www.aid.govt.nz/media-and-publications/development-stories/october-2011/developing-and-
protecting-marine-resources (last visited July 31, 2014). For the text of the agreement, see 
Arrangement Between the Cook Islands, New Zealand, Niue, Samoa, Tonga and Tokelau on 
Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement Subsidiary to the Niue Treaty on 
Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region of 9 July 
1992, http://www.tevakamoana.org/sites/default/files/downloads/te-vaka-toa-arrangement.pdf. 
 41.  Fisheries Surveillance Mission Accomplished—Operation Tui Moana 12, COOK ISLANDS 
HERALD (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.ciherald.co.ck/articles/h623d.htm. 
 42.  Update on the use of Information Exchange in combating Illegal Fishing, PACIFIC 
ISLANDS LAW OFFICERS’ NETWORK, 
http://www.pilonsec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=98:update-
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the Niue Treaty, as it would see a significant rise in the use of Article VI of the 
Treaty and would increase the level of enforcement operations in the South 
Pacific.43 
3. Case Study: Enforcement Cooperation—Australia-France Southern 
Ocean Agreements 
The remoteness of the far south of the Indian Ocean has encouraged 
cooperation between Australia and France. This represents the most complete 
level of cooperation between States with interests in managing the fisheries in 
and around their respective EEZs. 
Australia and France have built upon this ad hoc cooperation with respect 
to their possessions in the Indian Ocean sector. Both States concluded a treaty in 
2003,44 providing for continuing cooperation in surveillance,45 intelligence,46 
and scientific research.47 This arrangement permitted a speedier response to 
Southern Ocean cooperation, and allowed both States to make more efficient use 
of precious assets in such a remote region. 
More controversially, the treaty also provided that one State could 
authorize vessels of the other to continue a hot pursuit through its territorial sea, 
as long as no enforcement action took place within the territorial sea.48 This 
may be inconsistent with the letter of Article 111 of the Law of the Sea 
Convention,49 but the legality of the provision is still moot since none of the hot 
pursuits undertaken to date have passed through a third State’s territorial sea. 
The treaty was successful and was followed up with a more ambitious 
arrangement in 2007. Australia and France entered into a subsequent agreement 
to provide for cooperative enforcement within the EEZs of Australia and France 
in the Southern Indian Ocean.50 
The reach of the treaty is of interest. Cooperative enforcement is defined 
as: “Fisheries enforcement activities such as the boarding, inspection, hot 
pursuit, apprehension, seizure and investigation of fishing vessels that are 
ntsa&catid=3:pacific-law-and-justice news&Itemid=94 (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 43.  See Niue Treaty, supra note 37, art. VI. 
 44.  Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French Republic 
on Cooperation in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories 
(TAAF), Heard Island and McDonald Islands, [2005] ATS 6 (Austl.). 
 45.  Id. art. 3 and Annex I. 
 46.  Id. art. 5. 
 47.  Id. art. 3.5 and Annex II. 
 48.  Id. art. 3.3, 4. 
 49.  UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 111(3) (explaining that the right of hot pursuit ceases as soon 
as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State). 
 50.  Agreement on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas Adjacent to the French 
Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and the McDonald Islands, [2011] ATS 1 (Austl.). 
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believed to have violated applicable fisheries laws, undertaken by one Party in 
cooperation with the other Party.”51  
Notably, the definition makes it clear that the 2007 Agreement directly 
encompasses apprehension, seizure, and investigation. As such, there is 
cooperation with respect to policing elements up to the handover of the 
offending vessel and its crew to the other party and prosecution of offenses 
through the coastal State’s domestic courts.52 This is a remarkable level of 
cooperation. 
The Agreement deals with a range of matters that are designed to ensure 
the smooth running of any cooperative enforcement operations. Most 
importantly, there is a requirement that an appropriate fisheries officer of the 
coastal State be aboard the enforcing vessel. This presence is important as it 
gives the coastal State a scintilla of its own enforcement mechanisms within the 
enforcement activity undertaken upon its behalf. That said, the Agreement does 
not create a fiction of the single official exercising jurisdiction alone. Article 5 
makes it clear that jurisdiction is being exercised by the other party in the coastal 
State’s EEZ, although every effort will be made to comply with the laws of the 
coastal State.53 
The Agreement deals with a range of aspects of cooperative enforcement 
that are also important. First, the officers undertaking the enforcement are given 
immunity for any actions they take in the course of enforcing the coastal State’s 
law. This is an important safeguard in facilitating cooperation as well as 
maintaining the sovereign immunity of the warship carrying out enforcement.54 
Second, the Agreement notes that the cost of cooperation is ordinarily assumed 
to be borne by the enforcing rather than the coastal State. This would seem to 
assume that both States will undertake cooperative operations to an 
approximately equal extent, although the Agreement does foresee that some 
adjustment might be necessary if too much of the burden is borne by a single 
State.55 
The Agreement has now been afoot for some time, and there are reports of 
its having been utilized in enforcement actions,56 although with little public 
fanfare. Given that the two States concerned have similar capacities in the 
 51.  Id. art. 1.4. 
 52.  Vessels seized by a party pursuant to Article 3 in the maritime zone of the other party, or 
following a hot pursuit undertaken on behalf of the other party pursuant to Article 4, shall, together 
with the persons, equipment and any documents and catch on board, be handed over as soon as 
possible to the authorities of the other Party. See id. 
 53.  Art. 5(1) provides: “The Party whose authorised vessel, and its crew, is undertaking 
cooperative and enforcement activities in accordance with this Agreement, shall take all appropriate 
measures to ensure that the laws of the other Party are observed and respected.” Id. 
 54.  Id., art. 5(2). 
 55.  Id., art. 8. 
 56.  See COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., RURAL AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRANSPORT 
LEGISLATION COMMITTEE, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON NOTICE, Question 344 (Nov. 2013), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/Estimates/Live/rrat_ctte/estimates/sup_1314/ag/AFMA.ashx. 
 
13
Kaye: Enforcement Cooperation in Combating Illegal and Unauthorized Fis
Published by Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
2014]  COOPERATION IN COMBATTING UNAUTHORIZED FISHING 329 
region at issue and face similar challenges in combating illegal fishing in their 
EEZs, there is every reason to believe this effective cooperative regime will 
continue for the foreseeable future. 
CONCLUSION 
Cooperation in maritime enforcement is certainly growing, but to date 
examples beyond the most basal are relatively rare and are largely restricted 
either to areas that are very remote or where vast EEZs are essentially 
unpatrolled by extremely small States. Even in these unusual circumstances, 
anything beyond very simple cooperation is almost non-existent. Even an 
arrangement such as the Niue Treaty, which has existed for well over a decade, 
with the obvious and stated aim of facilitating cooperative enforcement, has 
largely gone unused. The reluctance of States to surrender any of their 
prerogatives to uphold their sovereign rights is certainly very strong and should 
not be underestimated. Given their limited capacity to effectively police their 
EEZs, many States have great incentive to embark upon cooperative measures, 
so it is telling that relatively little actual progress has been made. 
That said, there is still some reason to be optimistic. The recent efforts to 
provide for a permanent subsidiary agreement to the Niue Treaty and the 
Australia-France Agreement demonstrate that cooperation as a solution is still an 
avenue for some States. In the far-flung reaches of the world’s oceans, the 
prospect of using cooperative measures to resolve the difficulties of enforcement 
is still being considered, and such measures may be actively used to clamp down 
on illegal fishing. Perhaps in time, they may provide a way forward for greater 
cooperation. 
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